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Lost Over Libya: The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security 
Review - an obituary 
 
The British government’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) was intended to be a 
fundamental review of Britain’s defence and security posture. By the turn of 2011, the SDSR was 
being widely described as fundamentally flawed. This article examines the politics and strategic 
direction of the SDSR and it assesses the extent to which the SDSR was ‘strategic’. It goes on to 
evaluate how the 2011 intervention in Libya has impacted on the premise of the SDSR. This paper 
argues that the Libya policy highlights the critical disjuncture between the strategic intent underpinning 
the response to the Libyan crisis and the fiscally-led nature of an SDSR and the government’s inability 
to articulate a strategic vision for the UK.  
 
Introduction 
Immediately after the formation of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government 
following the May 2010 general election, the conduct of a Strategic Defence and Security 
Review (SDSR), in line with election manifesto pledges,1 was announced. This SDSR was 
published just prior to the Comprehensive Spending Review in October 2010. It was intended 
to be a fundamental review of Britain’s defence and security posture, based on the strategic 
need established by the 2010 National Security Strategy2, rather than another example of the 
budgetary salami slicing seen in the 1990s and in the revisions to the 1998 Strategic Defence 
Review (SDR) during the 2000s. The message was clear: the SDSR was distinctive precisely 
because it was the operational embodiment of the NSS’s strategic assessment. However, by 
the turn of 2011, the SDSR was already being seen as fundamentally flawed by 
parliamentarians, defence professionals and expert commentators alike.3 Shortly thereafter, 
the first live test of the SDSR’s conclusions came with the onset, in the early part of 2011, of 
the ‘Arab Spring’, the democratic contagion that spread across North Africa and the Middle 
East. The British government’s response to the crisis that developed in Libya as a result of 
                                                          
1 Conservative Party, Invitation to Join the Government of Britain, The Conservative Party: London, 2010; 
Liberal Democrats, Manifesto 2010: Change that works for you, Liberal Democrat Party: London, 2010. 
2 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, The Stationary 
Office: London, October 2010. 
3 Nick Richie, ‘Rethinking Security: A Critical Analysis of the Strategic Defence and Security Review’, 
International Affairs, Vol. 87, No.2, 2011, pp.355-76; House of Commons, Oral Evidence: The Strategic Defence 
and Security Review and the National Security Strategy, 18 May 2011, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/uc761-iv/uc76101.htm. 
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the Gaddafi regime’s response to pro-democracy demonstrations was particularly interesting 
in the context of the SDSR, in that it seemed to go against the core logic underpinning the 
review. To have ruled out – as the SDSR did - air-cover via aircraft carriers until 2015 at the 
earliest, airborne intelligence cover altogether, and a critical mass of capability required for 
such operations, but then be at the forefront (along with France) of the international 
commitment to a military response seemed confused. The government’s response also 
provided ample opportunity for opponents of the SDSR to highlight the strategic 
inadequacies within the government’s approach and focused attention on the far from 
straightforward question of what, in practice, ‘strategy’ actually means and requires.4      
It is in this context that this article examines the politics and strategic direction of the SDSR.5 
We assess the extent to which the SDSR was a ‘strategic’ defence review, and we argue – as 
our title implies – that the SDSR has been fatally undermined by the decision to intervene in 
Libya. 6  We argue that the Libya policy highlights the critical disjuncture between the 
strategic intent underpinning the response to the Libyan crisis and the fiscally-led nature of an 
SDSR driven by the Cabinet Office and Treasury without an explicit understanding (nor the 
ability to articulate it) of its relationship to political understandings of the UK’s wider 
strategic interests.  
From SDR to SDSR 
The October 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, Securing Britain in an Age of 
Uncertainty, was the first substantial United Kingdom (UK) defence review in over a decade, 
and represented the first time that strategy regarding defence, security and intelligence had 
been formally integrated into a single review. The previous defence review, New Labour’s 
1998 Strategic Defence Review7, had established the broad strategic direction of defence for 
the following decade, with just one updating strategy document, the Delivering Security in a 
                                                          
4 For excellent discussions about British strategy see, for example, Patrick Porter, Why Britain Doesn’t Do 
Grand Strategy, The RUSI Journal Vol.55, No.4, August 2010, p.6-12; John Gearson and James Gow, Security, 
Not Defence, Strategic, Not Habit: Restructuring the Political Arrangements for Policy Making on Britain's Role 
in the World, The Political Quarterly, Vol.81, No.3, 2010, pp.406-19 and Nick Witney, Britain’s Defence Review: 
The Real Strategic Questions, The Political Quarterly, Vol.81, No.3, 2010, pp.431-33. 
5 Others have considered the SDSR in a large number of different terms, and for examples of this see: Michael 
Codner and Michael Clarke (Eds), A Question of Security: The British Defence Review in an Age of Austerity, 
RUSI: London, 2011.  
6 Prior to the Libya operations, Colin Gray provided an interesting prescription for defence policy planners to 
consider strategic questions. Please see: Colin S. Gray, Strategic Thoughts for Defence Planners, Survival, 
Vol.52, Number 3, 2010, pp.159-78.  
7 http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-20825848E50E/0/sdr1998_complete.pdf  
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Changing World White Paper, being published thereafter, in December 2003.8 The purpose 
behind the October 2010 SDSR was to set out the practical direction of defence policy in the 
light of a strategic assessment that would inform the period of Conservative or coalition 
government to come in the same way that the 1998 SDR had defined New Labour’s era in 
defence policy.  
As the 2003 White Paper noted, the 1998 SDR had represented, “a fundamental rethink of 
how the Armed Forces and their supporting infrastructure should be structured to face the 
challenges of the increasingly complex security environment which followed the ending of 
the Cold War and the emergence of uncertainty and instability in many areas of the world.”9 
To this end, the conclusion of the SDR had been that the UK needed ‘modern’ armed forces – 
i.e. forces “equipped and supported for rapid and sustainable deployment in expeditionary 
operations, usually as part of a coalition.”10 By the time of the 2003 White Paper this capacity 
had been tested in the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq, bringing to the fore 
questions about military over-stretch. At the same time, though, the Western response to the 
events of 9/11 and the decision to invade Iraq had contributed to an international security 
environment characterised by even greater uncertainty than had characterised the post-Cold 
War environment of 1997-98, with the potential consequence that the UK’s armed forces 
faced “an even broader range, frequency, and often duration of tasks”.11 In this context, the 
White Paper concluded that: 
The breadth of the tasks [the Armed Forces] will be required to undertake, from 
peacekeeping humanitarian support and confidence building operations through to 
counter-terrorist and large-scale combat operations, demand that our forces be flexible 
and responsive, multi-roled and able to reconfigure to achieve the desired outcome. In 
taking forward effects-based planning and operations, our focus will move away from 
simple calculations of platform numbers to developing network enabled capabilities 
                                                          
8 Ministry of Defence, Delivering Security in a Changing World (Cm 6041-I, London, TSO, December 2003), 
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/051AF365-0A97-4550-99C0-
4D87D7C95DED/0/cm6041I_whitepaper2003.pdf. The early New Labour defence era was also replete with a 
number of European defence initiatives such as the declarations at Poertschach (October 1998), Saint Malo 
Accords (December 1998) and the negotiations towards the Nice Treaty. It is important to note that the so-
called Capabilities Catalogue (which was created at the 1999 Helsinki Council and aimed at providing Europe 
with the means to become a strong military actor by 2004) was never fully populated, and thus the failure to 
fill defence equipment gaps is not unique to the UK, but a pan-European phenomenon. 
9 Delivering Security in a Changing World, p.2. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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designed to achieve a range of strategic effects. A new range of equipment and systems 
entering service over the coming years will greatly enhance capability and ensure that 
UK forces remain amongst the finest in the world.12 
The origins of many of the problems confronted via the SDSR are to be found in the SDR. 
Expensive equipment procurement decisions (like the aircraft carriers) were highlighted in 
the SDR, but only resolved in the dying days of the Brown Labour government.13 Similarly, 
decisions regarding armoured troop moving vehicles (the ‘snatch Land Rover’/IED debate 
and Future Rapid Effect System - FRES) were botched or avoided during most of the New 
Labour 2000s, resulting in both anguish to service families and large cost over-runs and false 
starts (to the tune of £188m) in trying to sort these problems out in a hurried manner. At the 
same time, the absence of a thorough overhaul of defence management meant that the 
problem of the MoD’s inflexibility and unresponsiveness in the face of changing operational 
and commercial demands was never resolved.  
 
The defence challenges facing the newly-elected coalition government were set out in a 
January 2010 pre-election Conservative Party document, A Resilient Nation.14 The economic 
tension involved in continuing to play a lead international role in meeting the wide range of 
uncertainties set out in the 2003 White Paper is clearly evident in this document. It warned 
that the SDSR it would undertake if elected; “will need to be forward-looking and face up to 
some very tough decisions that have been put off for too long. Equipment programmes 
cannot be based on wish-lists or the fantasy world of what we would like to do if resources 
were unlimited.”15 Logically, this would also have implications for the automaticity with 
which the UK Armed Forces were committed to conflict situations, as policies and priorities 
were in future determined in the light of available resources. Hence, the SDSR would; “need 
to harness our national strengths - our willingness to play a part far beyond our borders, 
strong public support for our Armed Forces, the character of our fighting men and women, 
the strength of our defence industry and technologies – to an overall strategy which makes 
the most effective use of them rather than putting them in a state of permanent 
overstretch…That means calibrating our role and our capabilities to the sort of conflicts 
                                                          
12 Ibid, p.19. 
13 Roland Watson and Deborah Haynes, ‘Brown goes into battle with billions for defence’, The Times, 1st 
February 2010. 
14 The Conservative Party, A Resilient Nation: National Security Green Paper (Policy Green Paper No.13), 
January 2010. See, http://www.conservatives.com/News/News_stories/2010/01/A_Resilient_Nation.aspx.  
15 Ibid, p.11. 
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which are most likely to arise in the next twenty years not the last twenty.”16 The implication 
was clear – economic constraints would result in defence budget cuts which, in turn, would 
have a policy impact in mandating greater selectivity in the deployment of UK forces. The 
government did try to mitigate this by adopting an Anglo-French initiative begun by the 
Labour government in 2010. This November 2010 agreement was distinctive for the fulsome 
pledges of defence industrial base cooperation, leading to an Anglo-French prime contractor 
and the extent to which the two militaries would cooperate in the future including a joint 
expeditionary force.17  
 
Nevertheless, once it was underway, the SDSR was presented as being, “led by the 
requirements of foreign policy as well inevitable financial constraints”18 with these strategic 
requirements being understood in the context of the changing nature of warfare (i.e. ‘the 
conflicts of the next twenty years, not the last twenty’). As Foreign Secretary William Hague 
observed in a major foreign policy speech of July 2010: 
the nature of conflict is changing. Our Armed Forces are currently involved in fighting 
insurgencies or wars-amongst-the-people rather than state on state conflict, they are 
involved in counter-piracy operations rather than sea battles, the projection of force 
overseas rather than homeland-based defence. And security threats themselves are more 
widely dispersed in parts of the world which are often difficult to access, lawless and in 
some cases failing, where the absence of governance feeds into a cycle of conflict and 
danger that we have yet to learn to arrest but are likely to face more often.19 
This was the basis of what Secretary of State for Defence Dr Liam Fox termed the ‘2020 
option’ – “looking ahead to the end of the decade and deciding what we want our Armed 
Forces to look like at that time based on the foreign policy goals we have set ourselves, our 
assessment of the future character of conflict and anticipating the changes in technology that 
we will need to incorporate.” 20 This ‘looking ahead’ would be facilitated by the newly-
                                                          
16 Ibid. 
17 HM Government, Declaration signed by the UK and France following the UK-France Summit 2010 in London 
on 2 November 2010, http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/uk%E2%80%93france-summit-2010-declaration-
on-defence-and-security-co-operation/ 
18 William Hague, ‘Britain’s Foreign Policy in a Networked World’, Speech at the FCO, London, 1st July 2010, 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=Speech&id=22472881.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Liam Fox, ‘The Need  for Defence Reform’. Speech to the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, 13th August 
2010, 
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constituted National Security Council (NSC), which “agreed that the overarching strategic 
posture should be to address the most immediate threats to our national security while 
maintaining the ability to identify and deal with emerging ones before they become bigger 
threats to the UK. This flexible, adaptable posture will maintain the ability to safeguard 
international peace and security, to deter and contain those who threaten the UK and its 
interests, and where necessary to intervene on multiple fronts.”21 Nevertheless, this strategic 
vision existed in the context of, and so would be conditioned by, a Labour legacy of unfunded 
liability in defence estimated at approximately £38 billion in the 2010-2020 period. Short-
term cuts in the defence budget were an unavoidable consequence.  
Hence, the challenge for the incoming Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government 
was to address the multiple problems bequeathed to them by New Labour - under-investment 
in defence during the 2000s, unfunded defence spending promises via new programmes and 
the absence of replacements, institutional inertia within the MoD, the new security challenges 
from asymmetric and networked adversaries, the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and, of 
course, the record breaking deficit being carried forward by the Treasury. Whilst a long 
period of reflection was probably needed on defence and security policy, akin to that which 
preceded the 1998 SDR (a review which took over a year to complete), the coalition 
government’s prioritisation of rapid deficit reduction in effect outweighed all other 
considerations.22 Officials within the MoD, who were close to the SDSR process, described 
the SDSR as the best of all possible reviews in the circumstances, the clear implication being 
that the focus of analysis should be on the factors that framed the review, rather than on the 
review itself.23 
 
The 2010 National Security Strategy 
The SDSR was designed to be umbilically linked to the coalition government’s National 
Security Strategy (NSS), A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty. 24 Initially, the two 
documents were to be published together, but in the event were published separately on 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/SofS/20100813TheNeedForDefenceRe
form.htm.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Overseas development was somewhat controversially ring-fenced, but subsequently it was announced that 
overseas development aid was to be used as a tool to provide security and stability.  
23 Private information collected in Whitehall between August 2010, and April 2011.  
24 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (Cm 7953, 
London, TSO, October 2010), 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_1
91639.pdf.  
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successive days, on 18th and 19th October 2010. The NSS was based on the premise that in 
late 2010 Britain was “entering an age of uncertainty” and hence the NSS was “about gearing 
Britain up for this new age of uncertainty.”25 However, as noted above, ‘uncertainty’ had also 
characterised the environment in which the 1998 SDR was conducted and it was not clear 
why late 2010 promised to usher in a new “age of uncertainty”. Strategy always exists to 
mitigate the impact of uncertainty, which is inherent in the international system (more so on 
some readings of international relations theory than others). At the same time, it is clear that 
uncertainty provides a strong narrative for government action.  
 
Nevertheless, a restatement of Britain’s strategic aims and the means for achieving them was 
overdue by 2010. The absence of strategic thought in, for example, the piecemeal 
commitment to Afghanistan was, by the time of the NSS and SDSR, evident to many. The 
Public Administration Select Committee highlighted the absence of strategic thought in its 
2010 report, Who does UK National Strategy?26 Prime Minister David Cameron pointed to it 
in his 2010 Lord Mayor’s speech. 27 The absence of strategic thought and understanding 
around the initial Afghanistan commitment was also clear from the published diaries of 
Labour MP Chris Mullin. These recorded Prime Minister Tony Blair explaining to a meeting 
of backbench Labour MPs at the December 2001 fall of Kabul how Afghanistan’s future 
would evolve in three implicitly straight-forward stages: “First, the US, the UK, France and a 
few others would establish secure bases, Bagram airport for example. Second, there needed to 
be a UN force, involving Islamic countries. Third, the creation of a proper Afghan force.”28 A 
month later Blair was reassuring the same backbenchers that, “it was nonsense to talk about 
overstretch. We would be sending about a thousand troops for a maximum of three or four 
months and then someone else would take over.”29 
 
However, precisely what was meant by ‘strategy’, and hence the purpose of a NSS, was less 
straightforward than recognising the need for one. The PASC report identified a deficit in 
strategic thinking in the UK to the extent that the country had lost the habit of undertaking 
                                                          
25 Ibid, p.3. 
26 Public Administration Select Committee (PASC), Who does National Strategy? (HC 435, London, TSO, 
October 2010). In particular, see the evidence of Sir Robert Fry, formerly Director of Operations in the MoD (Ev 
36). 
27 David Cameron, Speech to Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 15th November 2010, 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2010/11/speech-to-lord-mayors-banquet-
57068.  
28 Chris Mullin, A View From the Foothills: The Diaries of Chris Mullin (London, Profile Books, 2009), p.239. 
29 Ibid, pp.245-6. 
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it.30 One consequence of this, itself in part a consequence of the contemporary ubiquity of the 
term, was that ‘strategy’ and ‘policy’ were often confused – or, at least, the distinction 
between the two was not fully understood (a trap into which the PASC considered the 
Foreign Secretary, William Hague, to have fallen31). In giving evidence, Hew Strachan (who 
chaired the government’s working group on the military covenant) offered the view that; “the 
relationship is an interactive one. In theoretical terms…the implication is that strategy flows 
from policy and in an ideal world that would be the case. But, in reality, there’s not much 
chance of implementing your policy if it’s strategically unsound and impossible to fulfil, so 
there is likely to be a much more dynamic relationship between the two.”32 In an effort to 
bring some clarity to discussion of strategy, the PASC offered a definition of strategy as 
being; “about dealing with uncertainty, complexity and the dynamic. It is not a plan or a 
paper. In modern politics it is about ensuring that the whole of government identifies and acts 
upon the national interest.” 33  This through-government commitment echoes that 
recommended by Strachan’s working group with the military covenant, and the government’s 
commitment to the concept.34 
 
Given such potential for confusion, it is reasonable to ask how effectively the NSS outlined a 
strategic vision for Britain. It began by outlining the government’s vision of Britain’s role in 
the world. The Foreword identified what might be regarded as three strategic priorities: 
 
In order to protect our interests at home, we must project our influence abroad. As the 
global balance of power shifts, it will become harder for us to do so. But we should be 
under no illusion that our national interest requires our continued full and active 
engagement in world affairs. It requires our economy to compete with the strongest and 
the best and our entire government effort overseas must be geared to promote our trade, 
the lifeblood of our economy. But our international role extends beyond the commercial 
balance sheet, vital though it is. 
 
                                                          
30 Public Administration Select Committee (PASC), Who does National Strategy?, op.cit. 
31 PASC, Who does National Strategy? para.12. 
32 Ibid, Ev 1, Q3. 
33 Ibid, para.11. 
34 Ministry of Defence (December 2010) Report of the Task Force on the Military Covenant 
(http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/3C6A501D-5A85-47C9-9D89-
B99C5E428061/0/militarycovenanttaskforcerpt.pdf) 
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Our national interest requires us to stand up for the values our country believes in – the 
rule of law, democracy, free speech, tolerance and human rights. Those are the 
attributes for which Britain is admired in the world and we must continue to advance 
them, because Britain will be safer if our values are upheld and respected in the world. 
 
To do so requires us to project power and to use our unique network of alliances and 
relationships – principally with the United States of America, but also as a member of 
the European Union and NATO, and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. 
We must also maintain the capability to act well beyond our shores and work with our 
allies to have a strategic presence wherever we need it.35 
 
On this basis, UK grand strategy might reasonably be interpreted as being designed to 
maintain and, where possible, enhance relative influence in these relationships and 
organisations, both via diplomacy and via an ability and willingness to deploy military force 
in support of shared goals. This is akin to the notion commonly used in EU studies of 
‘preferences’ and ‘policies’, where government preferences are stable over a considerable 
amount of time – for example, the UK’s strongly transatlantic disposition - and its policies 
are the short-term developments that give expression to the preferences.36 It is by being able 
to do the third of the things set out above (project power) that the first is achieved and the 
chances of achieving the second are greatly improved - so long as power is projected 
judiciously. In the NSS this strategic vision was boiled down to a definition of the UK NSS 
as being; “to use all our national capabilities to build Britain’s prosperity, extend our nation’s 
influence in the world and strengthen our security.” 37  These then were the ends, albeit 
presented in the language of a corporate mission statement. As the NSS recognised: “A 
national security strategy, like any strategy, must be a combination of ends (what we are 
seeking to achieve), ways (the ways by which we seek to achieve those ends) and means (the 
resources we can devote to achieving the ends).”38 The purpose of the SDSR was to move 
beyond this level of generalisation and identify ways and means - to outline how these ends 
would be realised, and the configuration of resources necessary to this realisation, in the 
                                                          
35 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, p.4. 
36 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’, International 
Organization, 1997, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp.513-53. 
37 Ibid, p.9. 
38 Ibid, para.0.14. Emphasis in original. 
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context of an analysis of both the actually existing security environment and future possible 
threats. 
 
To this end, the NSS indicated that the SDSR would set out how the coalition government 
would “sort out the mess we inherited” in order: 
 
• to ensure our forces in Afghanistan have the equipment they need; 
• to begin to bring the defence programme back into balance; and 
• to enable Britain to retain the best and most versatile Armed Forces in the world – 
better equipped to protect our security in an age of uncertainty.39 
 
However, there was an obvious tension here between the second and third aims. This 
extended to a tension between the opening statement of the NSS, that the government had 
“given national security the highest priority” and the later statement that the government’s 
“most urgent task is to return our nation’s finances to a sustainable footing and bring sense to 
the profligacy and lack of planning that we inherited.” 40 Given the limited reference to 
economic security as a strategic goal in the SDSR, and the clear governmental prioritisation 
of a rapid reduction in the national deficit – more rapid than that advocated by other political 
parties during the 2010 general election campaign – this seemed to suggest less a pan-
governmental strategic approach and more the traditional British approach to departmental 
budget-setting. 41  Moreover, the circumscribed timescale for the SDSR had itself been 
determined by the government’s requirement that it be concluded in parallel with the 
Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) and, to this end, the SDSR was led by a 
combination of Cabinet Office and Treasury.42 Moreover, reflecting the prevailing economic 
climate, while the SDSR was premised on Fox’s ‘2020’ timeframe, the overwhelming focus 
                                                          
39 Ibid, p.6. 
40 Ibid, paras. 0.1 & 1.9. 
41 These concerns were raised by both the PASC, Who does National Strategy? Paras. 61-63, and the Defence 
Committee, The Strategic Defence and Security Review (HC 345, London, TSO, September 2010), paras. 10-12. 
In the House of Commons debate on the SDSR, Chair of the PASC, Bernard Jenkin, explained that the PASC had 
found that: “Whitehall Departments each have their own version of strategy, with their own strategy units, but 
none of them knows what they are meant to contribute to national strategy, if they even knew what that was. 
That applies to the Treasury in particular. There is no doubt that the main strategic effort of this Government 
has to be deficit reduction, but I think that, as far as the Treasury is concerned, it is the Government's sole 
strategic effort. To have a sole strategic effort is strategic blindness, not strategy.” Hansard, 4th November 
2010, col.1115. 
42 Defence Committee, The Strategic Defence and Security Review, para. 12. 
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of the SDSR was the period to 2015 – i.e. the period of the CSR and the perceived needs of 
the Afghanistan campaign plus minimal additional requirements. 
 
The question of Afghanistan also represented a strategic tension. On the one hand, the NSS 
offered a succinct and clear statement of Britain’s strategic aims in Afghanistan as being, “to 
prevent Afghan territory from again being used by Al Qaeda as a secure base from which to 
plan attacks on the UK or our allies.”43 On the other hand, the future vision for Afghanistan 
was more characterised in terms of what it would not be than what it would be (“We want an 
Afghanistan that is not a threat to the UK or the international community.”44). This raised the 
question of the public declaration of a 2015 date for the withdrawal of British troops from a 
combat role in Afghanistan by Prime Minister David Cameron. How would progress towards 
the 2015 date be measured? What would happen if adequate progress had not been made as 
the date approached? What would be the effect of the announcement of a withdrawal date on 
the approach of insurgent forces? In a sense, this withdrawal date sat outside the strategic 
thinking that informed the NSS and SDSR, but the SDSR can be seen as having set the 
foundations for continued involvement in Afghanistan, with the possibility of change in 2015. 
 
Unlike the NSSs produced by the previous Labour governments, the October 2010 NSS 
involved a National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) which resulted in the identification of 
15 categories of risk, prioritised across three tiers based on an assessment of their relative 
likelihood and relative impact. Reflecting the importance attached to Afghanistan, the first 
tier included international (and Irish) terrorism alongside: attacks on UK cyber space and 
large-scale cyber crime; major natural disasters requiring a national response; and an 
international military crisis between states into which the UK and its allies are drawn, and 
into which other states and non-state actors could also be drawn.45 The range of threats – 
especially in the second and third tiers – together with the financial environment resulted in 
an emphasis on the importance of conflict prevention, and a highlighting of the importance of 
being able to identify risks at an early stage and so prevent them from developing into threats. 
As a consequence the government decided to focus all development aid on furthering British 
                                                          
43 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, para 1.2. 
44 Ibid, Box p.13. This was also largely true of Cameron’s treatment of Afghanistan in his November 2010 Lord 
Mayor’s Banquet speech, in which he explained: “We are not there to build a perfect democracy, still less a 
model society. We are there to help Afghans take control of their security and ensure that Al Qaeda can never 
again pose a threat to us from Afghan soil.” David Cameron, Speech to Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 15th November 
2010. 
45 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, p.27. 
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security interests and, in line with implicit recommendations in the 2005 Butler Review, to 
improve the government’s horizon scanning capability.46 This had been undermined by the 
decision to remove the position, in 2010, of DCDS Commitments, the principal intelligence 
customer in the MoD, whose job was to provide a macro-level estimate and to ensure that the 
MoD was configured to effectively confront future threats. Some in the MoD use the example 
of Libya to demonstrate the fallacy of removing this post, and we understand that it is 
currently under review in the MoD, with the key debates being around whether the post is in 
uniform (as had always been the case) or as a civil servant.  
 
The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 
The risks identified as Tier One via the NSS would determine the prioritisation of 
capabilities, which were set out in the SDSR – the balancing of ends, ways and means. How 
effectively the SDSR did this, and how far capabilities were driven by economic rather than 
strategic factors, is a question that came to dominate discussion of the SDSR, especially in 
light of the intervention in Libya.  
 
In terms of force deployment, the SDSR set out a vision whereby in future the UK would be 
able to simultaneously conduct: one enduring stabilisation operation at brigade level (up to 
6,500 personnel with maritime and air support (similar to, but at a lower level to, the 2010 
Afghanistan commitment); one non-enduring complex intervention (of up to 2,000 
personnel); and one non-enduring simple operation (of up to 1,000 personnel). Alternatively, 
it provided for three concurrent non-enduring operations (assuming no simultaneous enduring 
commitment – e.g. that UK troops had left Afghanistan by that point), or for a larger single 
intervention of up to three brigades with maritime and air support (at approximately 30,000 
personnel, around two-thirds the number deployed to Iraq in 2003).47  
 
Another dimension of the ‘means’ part of the strategic equation related to procurement 
decisions which would facilitate such operations. To this end, the SDSR announced the 
immediate cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 programme (a costly proposition given that it 
had not come into service, but was due to do so imminently), and the withdrawal of British 
forces from Germany by 2020 (contrary to popular belief, unlikely to generate savings for the 
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MoD as it does not own the land it uses in Germany and, moreover, is liable for repairs to the 
land when it hands it back). At the same time, the SDSR unveiled plans to decommission the 
UK’s existing aircraft carriers and Harrier aircraft while continuing with the procurement of 
the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier and procuring the carrier-variant of the Joint Strike 
Fighter.48 This would provide a future carrier strike capability, but not until 2020. One carrier 
would be held in ‘extended readiness’ (i.e. mothballed)49 or even sold,50 a decision postponed 
until the 2015 SDSR when, presumably, it would be made in light of economic performance 
relative to Treasury predictions. If it were to be sold, continuous carrier strike capability 
would depend on agreement with France on carrier sharing or access.51  
 
The SDSR had been clear that there was a “strategic requirement for a future carrier-strike 
capability”, but at the same time could not “now foresee circumstances in which the UK 
would require the scale of strike capability previously planned”,52 notwithstanding the over-
arching theme of uncertainty which informed the NSS and SDSR – and hence mandated a 
very different approach to the question of Trident. General Sir David Richards, Chief of the 
Defence Staff, conceded that the carrier decisions did represent both a risk and a trade-off in 
light of the demands of the commitment in Afghanistan, telling the Defence Committee in 
November 2010: 
 
In our collective judgement, it is certainly a risk, but it is less of a risk than doing away 
with certain other capabilities... It is jolly nice to know that, by 2020…we will have 
carrier strike back. It is a hugely useful and big reassurance. But between now and 
2020, particularly between now and 2015-16, looking at what our excellent intelligence 
services and our own analysis and defence intelligence tell us, and at our commitment 
to Afghanistan and the things from which that springs - namely extremist ideology - we 
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can manage without the carrier. We need aircraft, but we know we can deliver aircraft 
from land-based options, such as airfields.53 
 
The Politics of the SDSR 
Traditionally, in party political terms, defence has been a Conservative Party strength. Within 
Parliament defence experts were usually to be found on the Conservative benches. The party 
enjoyed the better links with defence professionals, some of whom routinely joined its 
number in the House of Lords upon retirement. Hence, expertise and institutional support 
were disproportionately concentrated in the Conservative Party, reflecting its self-image as 
the Party most committed to ‘strong defence’ and ‘standing up for Britain’. This image was 
reinforced during the 1980s by both the military campaign to recapture the 
Falklands/Malvinas Islands and the Labour Party’s formal adoption of a policy of unilateral 
nuclear disarmament in its 1983 general election manifesto. However, jettisoning the 
reputation for being ‘weak on defence’ that had contributed to Labour defeats in the 1983 and 
1987 general elections, and was still being utilised as a weapon in the Conservative armoury 
in the 1992 general election, became a priority for Tony Blair as leader of the Labour Party. 
 
Labour’s serial military interventions under Blair’s premiership also contributed to banishing 
the ghosts of Labour’s 1980s’ approach to defence. Now, Labour too had friends in the 
defence community (including in the defence industries), some of whom it promoted to its 
benches in the House of Lords. Greater expertise on defence could be found on Labour’s own 
benches in the House of Commons, which included former armed forces personnel. Under 
Blair, Labour’s advocacy of military interventionism presented the Conservative opposition 
with a dilemma. Unless it opposed the actual interventions it had little chance of creating 
clear blue water between itself and Labour. In relation to the Iraq war, this fact severely 
restricted the party’s ability to criticise and hold to account the Labour government, and the 
Prime Minister personally, when weapons of mass destruction were not found and the 
premise underpinning the war and the certainty with which it was expressed were exposed as 
being unfounded.  
However, by 2010 the Labour Party had come full circle, and was once more largely 
discredited on defence. By this time, as a result of Labour’s commitment to a military 
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interventionist foreign policy, the armed forces were seriously overstretched: the operational 
costs of Britain’s military commitments were increasingly challenging; senior retired military 
figures were speaking out in public54, criticising the government for breaching the ‘military 
covenant’55 and for insufficient investment in defence; coroners’ cases exposed equipment 
inadequacies which had been contributory factors in deaths56; and the families of those killed 
or injured in Iraq and Afghanistan were vocal and critical and, provided a focus for 
opposition to Labour’s military interventionism. In late 2009 and into 2010 a succession of 
witnesses to the Chilcot Inquiry into the Iraq War criticised the military preparation for it. 
The then Chancellor Gordon Brown was also criticised for seeking a “complete guillotine” of 
defence spending in December 2003, just nine months after the invasion.57 
The consequences of this were twofold. Firstly, the SDSR offered the Cameron coalition 
government the opportunity to unveil a strategic vision for defence in the next decade and so 
claim back defence as a Conservative strength. Secondly, the opposition to the SDSR was 
likely to be weak. The Conservatives’ Lib Dem partners were locked in the coalition 
embrace, and so unable to give voice to the distinctive positions on defence outlined in their 
general election manifesto - e.g. ruling out a like-for-like replacement for Trident and 
cancelling tranche 3B of the Eurofighter programme.58 The Labour Party was divided on the 
legacy of the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, and on the implications of these for any 
future policy that advocated a central role for military intervention, whilst wanting to strongly 
defend its record in government. Controversies over adequacy of equipment and equipment 
shortages in Iraq and Afghanistan meant it could not easily claim to represent the interests of 
the armed forces in a debate largely characterised by questions of where and how far cuts 
should fall. The fact that Labour had initiated the commitment to Afghanistan, and increased 
it in scale, had the effect of largely depoliticising Afghanistan as a front bench political issue. 
With this tacitly parked to one side, except for the question of adequacy of equipment – in the 
past (for the Conservatives) and in the future (for Labour), the focus of party political debate 
was on the nature of the proposed cuts and hence just how ‘strategic’ the SDSR actually was. 
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This debate was informed by the concerns expressed by Liam Fox in a letter sent to David 
Cameron on the eve of an NSC meeting to finalise the SDSR, and subsequently leaked to the 
Daily Telegraph. The focus of these concerns was both the direction of the review in absolute 
terms and also in relation to pre-election strategy documents. Fox expressed the view that: 
Frankly this process is looking less and less defensible as a proper SDSR and more like 
a "super CSR". If it continues on its current trajectory it is likely to have grave political 
consequences for us, destroying much of the reputation and capital you, and we, have 
built up in recent years. Party, media, military and the international reaction will be 
brutal if we do not recognise the dangers and continue to push for such draconian cuts 
at a time when we are at war…I am concerned that we do not have a narrative that we 
can communicate clearly.59 
He concluded the letter by warning that: “It would be a great pity if, having championed the 
cause of our Armed Forces and set up the innovation of the NSC, we simply produced a cuts 
package. Cuts there will have to be. Coherence, we cannot do without, if there is to be any 
chance of a credible narrative.”60 
The construction of a ‘credible narrative’ involved Cameron and Fox setting up several 
oppositionals during their presentation of the SDSR, via which they were able to contrast 
their handling of defence with that of the previous Labour government in order to reclaim 
‘strong on defence’ territory: 
Figure 1 - Narrative Points:  
Conservative Labour 
Costed Un-costed 
Responsible Irresponsible 
Selective Intervention Overstretch  
Treat the causes of conflict Deal with the consequences 
Coherence Mess 
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It also involved the securitisation of the economy to an extent not trailed in the NSS, as in 
Liam Fox’s contention that: “If we learned anything from the cold war, it is that a strong 
economy equals strong defence. The economic legacy of the previous Government is a 
national security liability. We were left with a situation in which the country's finances were 
wrecked while the world is a more dangerous place than at any time in recent memory.”61 
This led on to the presentation of the SDSR as involving two stages, the first (2010-2015) 
which involved difficult choices whilst the legacy of the Labour government was dealt with, 
and the second (2015-2020) which would be “about regrowing capability and achieving our 
overall vision.”62 Parliamentary opposition from the Labour benches was essentially limited 
to protests and lobbying relating to the implications for employment in particular 
constituencies. Indeed, some of the most effective questioning came from the Conservative 
benches – particularly the chairs of the Defence and Public Administration committees – 
James Arbuthnot and Bernard Jenkin respectively. Arbuthnot in particular occupied an 
interesting position in relation to the debate – Chair of a relatively powerful select committee 
whose business was defence, which had already published a report critical of the SDSR 
process, and in a climate in which the majority party governed from a position of relative 
weakness, being required to sustain a coalition with a party to which it had displayed a clear 
antipathy in that year’s general election campaign if it was to continue governing with an 
overall parliamentary majority. Having described the SDSR process as “pretty much rubbish” 
and offered the view that the, “haste of this review meant that an opportunity to consult the 
wider public, defence academics, the defence industry and Parliament was missed”, 63 he 
understood the SDSR in domestic political rather than solely strategic terms, explaining that: 
My greatest concern about defence is that the British, and perhaps the European, public 
believe that defence is a job done and that the end of the cold war meant the end of the 
need to spend serious amounts of money on defending our interests. They think we can 
rely on the Americans to protect us, but they are wrong: the Americans will protect us 
only for as long as it is in their interests to do so. Until our constituents demand that we 
spend more on defence, no Chancellor of the Exchequer will wish to do so, but that will 
not happen until the public are properly engaged in talking about defence or until they 
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understand its importance and purpose. If one conducts a defence review behind closed 
doors, while everyone is away on holiday and at a pace that would startle Michael 
Schumacher, no such understanding will arise.64 
Lost Over Libya 
The core tensions between the SDSR and the UK’s strategic posture were given even greater 
salience by events in Libya in early 2011. Did the vision outlined in the SDSR suggest that 
Britain would play the prominent role it did in relation to Libya, or did the intervention over 
Libya represent a deviation from that vision? What role did Britain aspire to play within the 
formal and informal international security architecture. This question is particularly pertinent 
to an era when the concept of failed or failing states and an emphasis on preventive 
interventions have combined to create an environment in which wars of choice rather than 
necessity are a key feature of security debates. In this environment, the extent to which the 
government views the UK as playing a lead role, or a supportive role, in these debates and 
interventions is a key strategic question. By no means all future scenarios arising from these 
considerations will represent a direct or discernible challenge to UK national security.  
While the NSS did contain a reference to “occasions when it is in our interests to take part in 
humanitarian interventions”65 (albeit not until Part Three) such interventions could hardly be 
said to have been presented as a priority or defining feature of Britain’s foreign and security 
policy. Prior to the SDSR, the Cameron government had moved to position itself as opposed 
to the serial interventionism of the Labour era and offering a different approach, more rooted 
in a traditional Conservative outlook. This seemed to suggest an approach that bore some 
relationship to that adopted by Prime Minister John Major and Foreign Secretary Douglas 
Hurd over the question of intervention in Bosnia in the mid-1990s. For example, in a 
September 2010 speech, Britain’s Values in a Networked World, Foreign Secretary William 
Hague explained how: 
We understand that idealism in foreign policy always needs to be tempered with 
realism. We have a liberal-conservative outlook that says that change, however 
desirable, can rarely be imposed on other countries, and that our ability to do so is 
likely to diminish with time. We know that we have to promote our values with 
conviction and determination but in ways that are suited to the grain of the other 
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societies we are dealing with, particularly in fragile or post-conflict states… 
Democracy cannot be imposed on other countries by ditkat or design. It was one of the 
many illusions of Communism that societies can be designed in the abstract and 
restarted at year zero. They cannot. Our own experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan 
should also teach us modesty in this regard…We should never turn a blind eye to 
countries which display the trappings of democracy while violating basic human rights, 
or that lay claim to the rule of law while lacking the independent courts and proper 
systems of accountability and transparency to prevent abuses of state power.  
But we do not have the option, unlike Gladstone or Palmerston, of dispatching gunboats 
and relying on the power of the British Empire.66 
Moreover, the entire emphasis in the NSS and SDSR on investing in conflict prevention was 
widely understood as being based on the fact that this was less costly than intervention, and 
that intervention would become increasingly rare for a combination of ideological and 
economic reasons. The logic of this view was that the threshold triggering a future 
humanitarian or other military intervention by the UK would be raised, and hence its 
occurrence would be far less frequent. Indeed, the SDSR explained that;  
we will be more selective in our use of the Armed Forces, deploying them decisively at 
the right time but only where key UK national interests are at stake; where we have a 
clear strategic aim; where the likely political, economic and human costs are in 
proportion to the likely benefits; where we have a viable exit strategy; and where 
justifiable under international law.67 
In presenting the SDSR to Parliament, Cameron had emphasised the difference between it 
and previous reviews, one of which was the shift “from a strategy that is over-reliant on 
military intervention to a higher priority for conflict prevention.” 68  In short, under the 
coalition, military intervention would not look like either the Iraq or Afghanistan 
interventions of the New Labour era. In that strategy concerns making strategic choices, this 
could even be seen as one of the key strategic indicators to emerge from the SDSR process – 
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that, in future, Britain’s world role would be less characterised by a ready interventionism but 
instead by an emphasis on conflict prevention.  
The Libyan intervention was clearly at odds with this logic, evident from the fact that the 
equipment best suited to undertake the Libyan operation had been taken out, or was being 
taken out, of service. As the First Sea Lord, Sir Mark Stanhope, conceded in June 2011, had 
the aircraft carrier Ark Royal not been mothballed it, together with its Harrier aircraft, would 
have been deployed in the Mediterranean.69 Rather than fly Tornado aircraft from a base 
made available by Italy at Gioia del Colle, the cheaper, more reliable and faster option (both 
strategically and tactically) of deployment from carriers could have been utilised. Further 
illustrating the gap between the strategic vision contained within the SDSR and David 
Cameron’s strategic vision as revealed over Libya, HMS Cumberland was diverted to the 
Mediterranean to take part in the operation whilst on its way back to the UK to be scrapped. 
Stanhope also expressed concern that, as a consequence of the SDSR, maintaining naval 
operations around Libya at the level of May-June 2011 would require “some challenging 
decisions about priorities” if the conflict dragged on over the summer.70 
 
Cameron’s Libya commitment was a product of a strategic sense of Britain’s role in the 
world that was absent as an identified driver of the SDSR, and was also absent from his own 
statements in presenting or explaining the SDSR. It was also absent from William Hague’s 
more traditionally Conservative articulation of Britain’s Values in a Networked World. This 
is why General Sir David Richards felt able to tell the Defence Committee that the country 
could “manage without the carrier” – because the kind of operations for which they would be 
required had not been accorded any prominence in the strategic review. For the equipment 
decisions that emerged from the SDSR to be so wide of the requirement generated by 
operations over Libya less than six months after the review requires some explanation. A 
number of possibilities suggest themselves. Firstly, that David Cameron suddenly chose to 
march outside the strategic understandings around which the SDSR was based – that is, 
Cameron himself undertook a sudden strategic shift that moved UK defence and security 
away from the premises of the SDSR. Secondly, that the SDSR was little more than a 
collection of separate, rather than joined-up and meaningfully prioritised, statements of broad 
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national interest designed to reassure the military, parliament and public that the forthcoming 
defence cuts were strategic rather than simply Treasury-led. The suspicion that they were not 
strategic was clearly articulated by the PASC and Defence Committee and their respective 
chairs throughout the SDSR process, and is reinforced by the case of Libya. Thirdly, that the 
Libya intervention was consistent with the strategy underpinning the SDSR given that it 
places such importance in the maintenance of the ‘special relationship’ with the US, as a 
consequence of which the government has a vested interest in making NATO clearly relevant 
in the 21st century. On this reading, apparently stepping outside the logic of the SDSR was 
consistent with the logic of the SDSR. This may have been the intent, but the performance of 
NATO without a US military lead, and perceptions of the commitment and capacities of 
individual member states, has served to raise questions about its future utility for the US 
rather than cement any US commitment to it. 71  Ultimately, then, the SDSR may well 
contribute to a weakening of NATO – undermining rather than securing its own strategic 
goals. Hence, even on this reading, in its inability to balance ends, ways and means, the 
SDSR has been exposed as strategy-lite.  
 
Conclusion: Balancing Ends, Ways and Means? 
We want to conclude by considering further this question of the relationship between the 
SDSR and the UK’s strategically central relationship with the US. Hidden in the detail of the 
NSS, and in contrast to Prime Minister David Cameron’s public rejection of “this thesis of 
decline”, lies the recognition that Britain’s world role may be unavoidably changing and that 
while Britain may continue to work hard to punch above its weight, this may merely mitigate 
some of the effects of this change rather than prevent their occurrence, echoing a debate that 
has existed within British defence circles since 1946. In his 2010 Lord Mayor’s Banquet 
speech, Cameron had explained Britain’s national strengths by reference to the fact that: 
We sit at the heart of the world’s most powerful institutions, from the G8 and the G20, 
to NATO, the Commonwealth, and the UN Security Council.  We have a deep and 
close relationship with America.  We are strong and active members of the European 
Union, the gateway to the world’s largest single market.  Few countries on earth have 
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this powerful combination of assets, and even fewer have the ability to make the best 
use of them.72  
At the same time, the NSS explained that: 
The world of 2030 will be increasingly multipolar, with power distributed more widely 
than in the last two decades. The circle of international decision-making will be wider 
and potentially more multilateral. We are already seeing new systems of influence 
develop where countries share interests and goals which are outside the traditional 
international architecture.73 
The G8 had evolved into the G20, the rise of China, India, and Brazil raised a series of issues 
for the UK, the EU continued to evolve, and the UN Security Council faced calls for reform 
increasingly difficult to ignore on rational grounds. Such changes to the international order, 
coupled with another one – unstated in the NSS or SDSR – the relative decline of American 
power, meant that the SDSR represented an opportunity for sustained strategic thought to be 
given to Britain’s role in the world at an appropriate moment. As Julian Lindley-French told 
the PASC: 
For the last 50 or 60 years, our penchant for balancing others has tended to lead us to 
seek common ground between the American worldview and the French-European view, 
to put it bluntly, but those pillars are changing. Those assumptions that we’ve had for 
50 or 60 years about where our best national effort should be made to achieve the most 
likely security for our citizens are themselves in question. Right now, I would put the 
question as being, how does the United Kingdom cope with the relative American 
decline? We handed over from British power dominating the system to American 
power dominating the system. Now, the Americans do not dominate the system as they 
did.74 
He also pointed to the reality that; “we’re no longer the ally of first resort that we once were 
because of performance in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that because of our position financially, 
we may have to say no for other reasons.”75 However, the NSS, and hence the SDSR, does 
not address this reality. The NSS reaffirms the relationship with the US as the UK’s most 
                                                          
72 David Cameron, Speech to Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 15th November 2010. 
73 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, para 1.15. 
74 PASC, Who does National Strategy? Ev2 Q4. 
75 Ibid, Ev2 Q17. 
23 
 
notable alliance and this was similarly reinforced by President Obama’s visit the UK in May 
2011.76 In the SDSR “our pre-eminent defence and security relationship with the US” is 
listed as the first of the “five priorities for our international engagement that we have 
identified as essential to our future security.”77 This helps explain the government’s role in 
Libya in 2011. As with the previous Labour government, the logic here is that the coalition 
government will have to work increasingly hard to prove its ongoing value to the US and 
maintain the ‘special relationship’ with the US. In the past the special relationship has, to a 
significant extent, been demonstrated by the country’s ability and willingness to deploy force 
in pursuit of goals essentially defined in Washington (this has been true since the time of the 
1950 Korean intervention and associated rearmament programme). 78  However, it now 
pursues this goal as a country with no aircraft carrier capability, a decision of symbolic and as 
well as military significance, and one that does not seem particularly strategic if a key goal is 
the maintenance of influence through a key role in NATO and propping up notions of an 
ongoing special relationship with the US.  
Indeed, in light of the Libyan intervention, there seems relatively little separating the 
coalition’s strategic approach to the world from that of the governments of Tony Blair or 
Gordon Brown: there is greater continuity than there is change. Indicative of this, in his 2010 
Lord Mayor’s speech, David Cameron characterised his government’s foreign policy as being 
“one of hard-headed internationalism..[that] will focus like a laser on defending and 
advancing Britain’s national interest.”79 Whether deliberately or not, this rather echoed the 
“hard-headed pragmatism” of which Tony Blair spoke as guiding his foreign policy in a 
keynote foreign policy speech in Texas in April 2002. Moreover, Gordon Brown had also 
termed his approach to foreign policy one of “hard-headed internationalism” in his 2007 Lord 
                                                          
76 “Our relationship with the US will continue to be essential to delivering the security and prosperity we need 
and the US will remain the most powerful country in the world, economically and in military terms.” HM 
Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, para.1.10. Later, it is described as being “central to our 
national interest.” Ibid, para.2.11.; David Cameron, David Cameron and President Obama: An essential 
relationship, The Conservative Party: London, May 24 2011, 
http://www.conservatives.com/News/Articles/2011/05/David_Cameron_and_President_Obama_an_essential
_relationship.aspx 
77 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, para. 
5.2. 
78 See, for example, John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, revised ed. 2006) and Mark Phythian, The Labour Party, War and 
International Relations 1945-2006 (London, Routledge, 2007). The intelligence relationship is the other 
important pillar. See, for example, Richard J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret 
Intelligence Agency (London, HarperPress, 2010). 
79 David Cameron, Speech to Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 15th November 2010. 
24 
 
Mayor’s Banquet speech.80 Foreign Secretary David Miliband said that this ‘hard-headed 
internationalism’ would still have resulted in an invasion of Iraq had Brown been Prime 
Minister in 2003.81 In this respect, the SDSR was less a review and more a reaffirmation of 
an approach that locks Britain into a pattern of behaviour. In this sense, the SDSR might be 
seen as merely the latest indication that the Acheson dilemma, of defining a post-empire 
international role, continues to haunt UK defence policymakers. 
This also helps explain why, despite the NSS and SDSR articulating a vision of a shift to 
conflict prevention (typified by the July 2011 cross-department initiative called Building 
Stability Overseas Strategy)82, there remains such a strong emphasis on conventional military 
capabilities. Given the emphasis on conflict prevention in the NSS it might well be asked 
why the UK needs a carrier capability at all, let alone a continuous carrier strike capability. In 
effect, the inclusion of the need to counter an “international military crisis between states that 
draws in Britain, its allies and other state and non-state actors” as the last of the Tier One 
risks in the NSS is necessary, as it reflects the lead role Britain seeks to retain in NATO and 
in EU foreign and defence policy-making, as well as its need to continue to attempt to prove 
itself a reliable ally to the US. In practice, this is likely to retain a greater prominence than the 
NSS suggests. However, it does undermine any notion that conflict prevention is likely to 
come to define Britain’s grand strategy in the coming years. 83  Moreover, the trade-off 
between long-term defence requirements and short-term economic priorities inevitably results 
in a strategic disjuncture. As James Arbuthnot noted; “the thrust of [the SDSR] seems to be 
that we shall be gambling our security in the short term in exchange for its enhancement in 
the longer term. That is preferable to the reverse, provided that we always have at the front of 
our minds the need not to fail in Afghanistan.”84Hence, while the SDSR was presented as an 
innovative recasting of defence policy its continuities are its most significant characteristic. 
Through it the iterative recasting of British defence continues on, with only its bureaucratic 
underpinnings being subject to radical review. It represents a missed opportunity for a 
genuinely strategic approach to British defence and security. 
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